Contesting Inequalities In Access Rights To Lake Kariba’s Kapenta Fishery An Analysis Of The Politics Of Natural Resource Management. by Nyikahadzoi, Kefasi
Centre for Applied Social Sciences 
University of Zimbabwe 
P.O Box MP167 
Mount Pleasant 
HARARE
Zimbabwe ■
CASS Occasional Paper Series CPN 112/2001
Contesting Inequalities In Access Rights To 
Lake Kariba’s Kapenta Fishery
An Analysis Of The Politics Of Natural 
Resource Management
By
Kefasi Nyikahadzoi 
March 2002
This paper is also available as a chapter in “African inland fisheries: The Management 
Challenge”, a book edited by Geheb K and Sarch M.T in 2002. This paper was published with 
assistance of a grant from NORAD. The views expressed are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of CASS, University of Zimbabwe or NORAD
Abstract
The pelagic fishery o f  Lake Kariba is shared between Zimbabwe and Zambia. The fishery exploits the freshwater sardine, 
the ‘kapenta’ (Limnothrissa miodori). In 1999, the governments o f the two countries established a protocol for joint 
management o f  the fishery. The protocol sets the agenda for what each country does in the management o f  kapenta within 
its jurisdiction. The management objective o f  the protocol is to ensure that the yield from kapenta is ecologically sustainable 
and economically viable within an equitable framework. To achieve this objective each country is supposed to develop a 
management plan, within the framework o f  the protocol, which takes the historical and political context o f  each country into 
consideration. The Zambian government adopted a community-based integrated management system that encompasses both 
the inshore and the kapenta fishery. In Zimbabwe, the colonial era left a depressing legacy o f an extremely unequal 
distribution o f  resources between blacks and whites. On the Zimbabwean side, the question o f redistributing permits from 
bigger to smaller firms and from white to black operators according to national policies has been the overall management 
issue. The process has generated a lot o f  conflicts between fishers and the state. Fishers are left out o f  decision-making. This 
paper explores the tension and interplay between the state and fishers that is structured by the political need to address 
historical imbalances.
Introduction
The pelagic fishery of Lake Kariba is shared between Zimbabwe and Zambia (Figure 1), and exploits a 
freshwater sardine (Limnothrissa miodori), the ‘k a p e n ta For shared resources, the decision on what the total 
allowable number of fishing units should be is not just a question of following the scientific advice of national or 
regional scientific institutions. The decision is also based on the demands of other countries sharing the 
resource, and the total allowable number is most often arrived at through negotiation between the riparian states. 
Once the number of units per country is determined, each country takes into account its historical, political, and 
industrial structures and social conditions to decide on the allocation of access rights to its nationals. The 
decision on the number of fishing units that a fisher can own involves different interest groups, each fighting to 
obtain its share of the resource. The possibilities of influencing the outcome depends to a large degree on their 
organisational abilities, their connections to the central political authority and, more importantly, on the 
institutional order governing the distribution (Apostle, et al. 1998; Hersoug and Holm, 1999).
We may identify three institutional orders governing the distribution of access rights to a resource. These are the 
community, the market and the state. (Apostle et al, 1998; Hersoug and Holm, 1998). The community 
governance paradigm is characterised by close inter-personal ties among members, multiplex social networks 
and shared identities (Hersoug and Holm, 1999; Leach et al., 1999). The community paradigm emphasises the 
equitable distribution of access to resources, and therefore provides solutions in situations where this is absent 
(Hersoug and Holm, 1998; Hersoug, 1996). The community paradigm tends to favour small, local and 
traditional participants or user groups. The concepts of local management and local user participation seeks to 
embed fisheries management in local community structures (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994; Jentoft, 1989). This 
paradigm is therefore difficult to establish where the fishery is exploited by highly capitalised companies 
comprised of heterogeneous owners.
The state governance paradigm is broadly characterised by a top-down, centralised bureaucratic command and 
control mode of decision-making (Hersoug and Holm, 1998; Pomeroy and Williams, 1994; Apostle et al, 1998). 
The state governance paradigm is recommended in a situation where over-exploitation and the unfair allocation 
of resources amongst nationals are the main problems of a fishery. In this paradigm, therefore, the central state 
is seen as an important actor in transforming social relations. In a democratic state like Zimbabwe, however, 
politicians do not always remain in control as important policy decisions are influenced by organised interest 
groups.
The market-based property rights resource management system suggests competition, economic efficiency and 
rationality (Apostle et al, 1998; Hersoug and Holm, 1999). It aims to deal with situations where over-capacity, 
underdevelopment and the inefficient allocation of resources are the main problems of fisheries management. 
The tradable licenses, lease and quotas now implemented in several countries seek to redress the inefficiencies of 
state governance by utilising market mechanisms (Copes, 1996). Some market governance has, however, had 
inequitable consequences. For example, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) for Icelandic cod have caused 
control of industry to shift to a few large operators (McCay and Acheson, 1987). This has resulted in reductions 
in the number of films and jobs. Policies grounded in the market paradigm fail to address issues of social equity, 
as the goal of economic efficiency often clashes with that of maintaining rural communities (Waters, 1991; 
Corten, 1996)
/
Each of the three institutional orders has a distinct capacity for redistribution of access rights to natural resources 
in somewhat different directions. Under the market paradigm, the principle of efficiency ensures that actors able 
to exploit the most efficient strategies will gain control over the resource. Relying on the community paradigm, 
however, could undermine the big companies in favour of local traditional communities. The governance
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structure of the state emphasises control. The process of redistribution, however, depends on the extent to which 
politicians retain complete control, and are able to resist the influence of lobbying groups and negotiations over 
policy (Hersoug and Holm, 1999).
This paper seeks to discuss the key policies and statutes in fisheries that influence the redistribution of kapenta 
fishing licenses on the Zimbabwean side of Lake Kariba. The type and capacity for redistribution, however, is a 
question of choice of governance paradigm (Hersoug and Holm, 1999). Whatever the choice made, the goal of 
redistribution involves making trade-offs between the incompatible requirements of the three institutional orders 
of state, market and community. Each of the three paradigms has had an influence on the effort of redistributing 
licenses within the kapenta fishery. The paper focuses on how licence redistribution has fared given tensions 
generated by the need to take into account (a) the pressure for retaining the role of the state; (b) participation of 
users and (c) tire pursuit of economic efficiency through market solutions.
The evidence presented in this paper is based on fieldwork conducted between August 2000 and March 2001. 
Key informant interviews with purposively selected kapenta fishers and resource managers were undertaken. 
Additional data has also become available through the works of other researchers. These are referred to and 
discussed in light with findings.
The kapenta fishery management
Basin 4
Bumi ChaUla
iKariba
Zambia ) Sanjati Basin
Basin. 3
Sengwi Basin
Sinaiongwe. /
■' l
f  p  ^
Basin 2
Bingi Basin
Basin 1
Mlibla
Figure 1: Map of Lake Kariba. 
Zambia and Zimbabwe
Basin 5
0 20 40km
to 18,000 metric tonnes offish annually (Songore et al. 2000).
The Zimbabwean kapenta fishery 
resource of Lake Kariba is defined 
as state property. The state makes 
decisions concerning access to the 
resource, level and nature of 
exploitation. The state employs 
several measures to manage the 
resource, including licensing, area 
closure and area zoning.
Licensing
Non-transferable licenses are 
issued annually by the state 
through Department of National 
Parks and Wild Life Management 
(DNPWLM). In Zimbabwe, a 
fishing license is equivalent to a 
fishing vessel. One company can 
therefore hold several fishing 
licenses. There are 280 kapenta 
fishing vessels registered to 73 
fishing companies, which land up
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Area closures
Shallow areas that are less than twenty metres deep, rivers and river months are considered to be breeding areas, 
and are closed to fishing. Areas near recreational parks and development areas are also closed to fishing to 
accommodate other multiple-uses of the lake (tourism, sport fishing, and safari operations).
The allocation o f fishing basins
Fishing sites were originally allocated near Kariba Town from where most companies continue to operate. With 
the growth of the industry, new sites were opened in Chalala/Bumi, Sengwa, Binga and Mlibizi basins (see Fig. 
1). Permits issued contain provisions that limit the basin in which vessels may operate, and license holders are 
not pennitted to fish outside that basin (see Table 1 for the distribution of fishers by basin/fishing zone).
Basin White-ownedCompanies
Blaek-ow ned 
Companies
Rural District 
Councils Co-operatives
Co. Vessels Co. Vessels Co. Vessels Co. Vessels
Mlibizi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Binga 6 21 1 2 1 3 5 10
Sengwa 7 20 1 2 1 3 5 13
Bumi 12 64 0 0 0 0 2 4
Sanyati 19 96 6 22 1 4 5 14
Total 44 201 8 26 3 10 18 43
Table 1: Distribution of fishers by Basin and race in 2000
Regrettably, the allocation of fishers per basin is based on unsubstantiated research. It was hoped that assigning a 
basin to a given limited and identifiable number of fishers might encourage self-management. Based on some 
empirical evidence, many scholars argue that only small groups can organise themselves effectively (Ostrom, 
1995; Murphree 1991; Baland and Platteau, 1996), especially if the population is homogeneous. This argument 
overlooks, the fact that communities and their environment are often heterogeneous. There seems to be little 
reason for restricting fishing in a particular basin when kapenta can move anywhere in the lake and the fishing 
vessels have to search for them. By doing so they can stray out of the fishing basins and this is unlikely to have 
any effect on the total fish stock.
The zoning regulation has given some operators advantages over others. It has created two types of inequalities. 
Firstly, the productivity of these basins varies significantly due to variations in the zooplankton levels. Total 
zooplankton densities are always highest in Basin 1 (Mlibizi) followed by basin 2 (Binga). Basins 3, 4 and 5 
(Sengwa, Bumi arid Sanyati) always have lower densities than basin 1 and 2. However, basin 5 (Sanyati) usually 
has higher densities than basin 3 and 4. The plankton density gradient observed from Mlibizi to Bumi is 
expected of river-fed man-made reservoirs because of the gradient in nutrient concentrations. Sanyati Basin, the 
most downstream of the 5 basins, should be the least productive. This is not so because of the effect of the high 
nutrient inflow from the Sanyati River (Masundire, 1997; Moreau, 1997). The other rivers do not have much 
effect on pelagic zooplankton because they drain smaller catchments with lower levels of nutrients (Masundire, 
1997).
Secondly, the zoning approach used did not consider other important issues that affect the economic 
perfonnance of operators fishing in the different basins. These included (a) the influence of waves that disrupted 
fishing, reduced fishing time, and increased wastage. Waves are particularly problematic in basins 1 and 2; (b)
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distance to the nearest urban centre where operators obtained supplies such as fuel, and salt; and (c) availability 
of markets for kapenta. Fishers in the Sanyati and Binga basins operate from Kariba Town and Binga service 
centre respectively. The rest operate from remote areas, (d) Finally, the zoning did not take into account variable 
ecological conditions and differences in production across the lake. Up to now, regulations linking licenses to 
basin have not been revised. Failure to take into account the variations in resource productivity and the costs of 
operating in different locales undermines the performance of the new entrants who are assigned to very remote 
fishing basins.
The heterogeneity of the physical characteristics of the lake causes variations not only in resource productivity, 
but also in patterns of interaction. Some fishers have contested the creation of these physical boundaries by 
fishing illegally in other fishers' entitlements., For example, fishers in the Binga basin, where poor water 
visibility reduces the arc of light attraction, poach in the Sengwa basin. Fishers in less productive basins (Bumi 
and Chalala) also fish illegally in the Sengwa basin.
Kapenta fishing methods
Kapenta fishing is done at night using light attraction and lift nets. Besides marine engines, a fishing vessel has 
to be equipped with an electric generator and powerful mercury lights. The dip net is lowered into the water, and 
tire lights then turned on to attract the kapenta. When enough fish have gathered above the net, it is then hauled, 
using either a hydraulic or manual winch.
The Colonial Legacy in Zimbabwe
Like many post colonial states, the government of Zimbabwe inherited a dual socio-economic system based on 
racial privilege. At independence, the economy was characterised by the inequitable distribution of income and 
productive assets in favour of a white minority (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981). The kapenta fishery was no. 
exception. The initial selection of kapenta fishers was done at the DNPWLM headquarters during the white rule. 
People who had experience in commercial farming (fisheries fell under the ministry of agriculture at that time) 
and large sums of money were eligible for a kapenta-fishing license (Marshall, et al., 1982; Hutton, 1991). There 
was no limitation on the number of licenses or fishing vessels that could be held by a fisher, and hence the size 
of the individual fishing operations that developed varied considerably. From the outset, therefore, the criteria 
used to allocate kapenta fishing licenses favoured white commercial farmers against black peasant farmers. This 
was accentuated by the fact that fisheries management and administration within the DNPWLM was dominated 
by whites.
Historically, there has been a lack of cooperation between white and black communities. Even before the war of 
liberation, there were separate development initiatives between black and white fishing communities. In 
Rhodesia, fisheries development fell under two authorities the Ministry of Agriculture provided extension 
services to the European controlled fishery. In tribal areas, extension was the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which had a unit with just one fisheries officer (Rhodesian Herald, 26 August 1975). This 
resulted in disparities in fishing skills and expertise between white and black fishers. Black fishers were 
restricted to small-scale fisheries, while whites came to dominate the large-scale, multi-million dollar kapenta 
fishing industry.
The initial selection process, therefore, benefited white entrepreneurs the most. The larger population of black 
people did not benefit, the major reason being that the national education and manpower policies at the time 
were generally designed to ensure the existence of cheap and unskilled black labour pool (Murphree et al., 
1975). H^nce the blacks' entrepreneurial skills were very limited (Bourdillion, et al., 1985). The colonial
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government depended on the importation of skills mainly from overseas (Murphree et al., 1975), and these 
policies hindered local skill formation, especially amongst blacks. Blacks provided labour to most industries, 
including the kapenta fishing industry where they are still employed as boat crews, fish processors and packers. 
In addition, most black people did not have acceptable collateral and could not, therefore, qualify for bank loans 
to start up kapenta fishing. The lack of collateral has a historical explanation. Local blacks have been excluded 
from ownership of means of production and from any economic activity that would enable then to make 
meaningful savings. As a result, only white fishers were licensed to exploit the kapenta fishery before 
independence.
Zimbabwean policies on natural resource distribution
In 1980, the Zimbabwe Government, wishing to redress racial imbalances in resource access, embarked on 
policies and strategies aimed at promoting the equitable distribution of income, the sustainable use of resources 
and to increase user participation in the management of natural resources (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981). To 
address the inequalities in resource distribution, the government introduced its ‘growth with equity’ policy in 
1981. The policy contains two objectives of direct relevance to natural resource management. The first objective 
is “to end imperialist exploitation and achieve greater and more equitable degree of ownership of natural 
resources [and to] promote participation in and ownership of, a significant portion of the economy by nationals 
and the state” (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981: 2). The second objective is “...to conserve our natural 
resources so that production is sustained, replace renewable resources used, exploit our natural resources at rates 
consistent with the needs of present and future generations of Zimbabwe" (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981: 3).
To effectively redistribute fishing permits from established fishers to black fishers, and realise the equitable 
distribution of the fishery resource, the Minister of Mines, Environment and Tourism is empowered through 
Section 82 of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 to revoke fishing permits. In section 83B, the minister may ‘if 
necessary or desirable to do so in the interests of the preservation, conservation, propagation of any fish within 
Zimbabwe prohibit any person from fishing absolutely or subject to certain conditions or from possessing fishing 
gear’ (Hutton, 1991: 13). It seems the Act concentrates considerable power with the Minister. He may or may 
not give any reason for the withdrawal of licenses. It is not obligatory for him to authorise compensation to 
anyone unduly affected by the termination of a permit.
While appearing to be captious, the sweeping authority of the Minister to issue and revoke licenses was 
presumably intended to give National Paries wardens power to deal with persistent offenders, such as anglers 
who exceed catch restrictions, used inappropriate gear or fished in closed areas. Today, with an industrialised 
fishery such as the kapenta, which employs over 3000 people, this authority has caused considerable panic 
amongst established fishers and conflicts between the DNPWLM and fishers.
Soon after independence, kapenta fishing was a very lucrative business: There was pressure on government from 
emerging black entrepreneurs to redistribute national natural resources; equitably among the citizens of all races. 
The government, ‘...desiring to establish a society founded on socialist democratic and egalitarian principles’ 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1981: 2) issued twelve licenses to emerging co-operatives in 1986. However, 
despite an increase in the number of fishers, catches did not increase. The Zimbabwean government interpreted 
this fall in catch per unit of effort as an indication .of over-exploitation. The DNPWLM then adopted a 
precautionary approach to issuing new licenses because the size of the biomass was unknown. Licenses were 
issued progressively, and mean fish length and catch size carefully monitored. Only two new licenses were 
issued between 1990 and 1995 and none has been issued since then, while the Department awaits the results of a 
stock assessment programme. What this meant, therefore, was that equitable distribution could only be achieved 
through the redistribution of existing licenses from large companies (mostly white owned) to small and emerging
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companies and to-operatives (mostly black-owned). In the process, three types of business organisations 
emerged within the kapenta fishery. These were public ventures (run by local authorities), co-operatives and sole 
proprietorships owned by both white and black fishers. This development also resulted in two institutions being 
created along racial lines that mediated on behalf of their respective members on issues regarding license 
redistribution. The Indigenous Kapenta Producers Associations (IKPA) represented the interests of black fishers.
It seeks to lobby for equatable redistribution of licenses. The IKPA has political clout and sympathy derived 
from government. On the other hand, the Kapenta Producers Association (KPA) represents white fishers' 
interests. It main mandate, among many others, is to protect the interests of members during the restructuring 
process. It is interesting to note that the management of the fishery is not on the agenda of the two associations.
Scientific socialism and co-operative development
Zimbabwe’s post-independence policies of scientific socialism tended to view any private business as ' 
individualistic, exploitative and parasitic (Maphosa, 1996). This policy environment was not conducive for the 
creation of small private business. Individually owned business had considerable difficulties in qualifying for 
government assistance. As a result, there are only eight black-operated companies within the kapenta fishing 
industry at this time. The government’s attention and energy was instead directed towards co-operative 
enterprises, thereby extending socialist and popular democratic participation in ownership and the management 
of natural resources.
The government therefore set up training facilities for co-operative members so as to ensure the democratic, 
orderly and profitable functioning of co-operative enterprises (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981). In 1986, the 
government facilitated the formation of co-operatives for the commercial fisheries of Lake Kariba. There are 
now 18 co-operatives within the kapenta fishery which control 15% of the fishing vessels on the lake. Most co­
operatives started with initial group savings and sought assistance from government. Government controlled 
parastatals (for example, the Small Enterprise Development Corporation) and government departments (Ministry 
of National Affairs Employment Creation and Co-operatives (MNAECC)) advanced soft loans to the co­
operatives to enable them to improve their management and operational capacity. However, the cost of setting up 
co-operatives far exceeded what parastatals and the government were prepared to pay. Therefore, members had 
to'seek financial assistance from international aid organisations. Non-governmental organisations, such as MS 
Zimbabwe, and government departments provided training in managerial skills. The idea of co-operatives was an 
attempt to involve indigenous Zimbabweans in the exploitation of the kapenta fishery and, in a sense, simulate 
the community paradigm discussed earlier
The co-operatives were supposed to survive in the same way companies in business do. They were set up to 
compete in conditions determined by other companies that had been in business for some time and which had 
developed highly efficient production techniques and an elaborate understanding of market conditions. Some of 
these companies had operated during extremely adverse periods, such as under the economic sanctions during 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence period, and had developed very good planning and management 
strategies.
i
The promotion of co-operatives exposed new fishers to stiff competition with established white fishers who has 
an elaborate understanding of the market, and well endowed and skilled to deal with the market chains. Besides, 
these established companies were capable of operating in the hardest of circumstances because of the economies 
of scale acquired over years of fishing. White fishers were not only engaged in fishing and processing, but also 
in retail marketing, and offered a wide range of products both for local and export markets. Some of these fishers 
also had facilities to market fresh fish. Wealth inequalities based on differences in skills, experience, better 
management and a willingness to accept greater risks have persisted over the years. Some co-operatives have
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gone bankrupt, and others nave failed to service loans. There are several reasons why these co-operatives did not 
perform very well. Firstly, there was inexperience, and internal financial abuse within some of these co­
operatives. Secondly, most co-operatives operated in remote areas, making it difficult to buy inputs and to 
market their kapenta. Thirdly, the average co-operatives operated three fishing vessels, which was insufficient 
to support co-operative members, service loans and meet all operational costs. Fourth, the launching of economic 
structural adjustment programmes (ESAP) in 1991 weakened the government's thrust towards socialism and 
opened the economy to market forces. The government then withdrew financial support for co-operatives. The 
withdrawal of parastatals from provision of credit has been replaced by private sector. However, probaly because 
of high transaction costs and inability to enforce contracts with co-operatives (Maphosa, 1996), private 
financiers are unwilling to provide credit to cooperatives. Finally, the high transaction costs associated with 
democratic control and management of business operations probably accounted for much of the poor 
performance of the co-operatives.
As a result, some co-operatives have stopped operating and now earn an income by leasing out their licenses, 
fishing vessels and premises to wealthy and established white fishers (Moinuddin, 1991). Under this 
arrangement, the ownership of licenses remains with the licensee who then transfers the management of his 
vessel to more efficient operators. One can therefore operate several vessels that may still be formerly owned by 
another fisher. This violates the non-transferability of the licenses, and the practice has facilitated the emergence 
of large oligopolistic companies in some basins. The objectives that the co-operatives were intended to achieve 
no longer guide their activities. This complicates the management of the fishery, especially were resource users 
are called upon to contribute to this.
The evidence presented above does not necessarily mean that co-operatives are a bad business organisational set 
up. There were, however, some co-operatives that did succeed. Most of these were based in Kariba and at Binga, 
where proximity to input supplies and readily available fish markets probably contributed to their success. There 
were also some entities mn by individual black fishers which, although displaying some teething problems, are 
now performing well.
License redistribution during the first ten years
Despite efforts to redistribute access rights to the fishery through affirmative action, white owned companies 
have continued to increase both in absolute numbers and in the size of their operations since independence in 
1980 (Table 1). In the early 1980s, a number of factors combined to increase the importance of the Zimbabwean 
commercial fishing industry. For example, during the drought years of 1982, beef supplies diminished and 
organisations such as the World Food programme purchased large quantities of kapenta for famine relief in the 
rural areas (ZZSFP, 1989). The distribution of dried kapenta to many parts of the country where fish was not a 
traditional part of diet resulted in a much wider acceptance of the product (ZZSFP, 1989). The increase in meat 
prices has further increased demand for kapenta. In response to this, the government gradually issued more 
licenses to new and existing companies irrespective of race. For the first ten years after independence, the 
government was more concerned with the national food security than correcting racial imbalances. The drought 
of 1982, derailed the government's initiatives towards equitable distribution.
1979 19SI) 1985 1990 1 9 95 -2000
Category Fishers Boats Fishers Boats Fishers Boats Fishers Boats Fishers Boats
White 22 61 37 132 33 156 39 199 44 201
Blacks 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 8 26
Co-operatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 12 18 43
Local Authorities 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 2 3. 10
Total 22 61 37 132 33 156 52 214 73- 280
Table 2: Changes in the categories of fishers on Lake Karib'a (Zimbabwe). Source: Lake Kariba Fisheries 
Research Institute Database 2000
During this period, efforts to redistribute licenses were frustrated by high operating costs and poor returns on 
new investments in the fishing industries. Soon after independence, two blades were issued with licenses to fish 
kapenta. One of these was licensed to operate from Gache Gache, a very remote location. He sold his business 
after just six months of starting to a white fisher, claiming that operating just one license/fishing vessel was not 
viable, and because his landing site was too remote (Bourdillion et al., 1,985:120). The second black person, a 
woman, was given three licenses, but then sold her business to her white financial backer and moved into the 
retail side of the kapenta fishery which does not require a lot of capital investment (Bourdillion et al., 1985: 
121). This further strengthened the position of white fishers within the kapenta fishery. There are two possible 
explanations for the failure of these new entrants. Firstly, the location of the fishing operation is important in 
determining the profitability of kapenta fishing. And secondly, experience and the number of fishing units are 
crucial for profitable exploitation of the kapenta.
For most fishing companies, fishing is the main livelihood source. For this reason, they have invested a lot of 
money and time in the fishery. The redistribution of licenses is politically motivated, and there is no biological 
nor economic justification for it. With very little knowledge regarding the status of the kapenta, managers 
become very conservationist and set arbitrary harvesting levels far below resource threatening levels (ZZSFP, 
1997). In this situation, the chronically unsatisfied white fishers defend their access rights and pressurise 
resource managers to implement liberal harvest levels instead of redistributing their licenses. They argue that 
many more black fishers can be recruited into the fishery without taking licenses from the whites and, at the 
same time, without putting the fishery at risk of collapse. The economic and political power that the established 
-> white owned companies have acquired over the years have allowed them to maintain their positions. Among the 
white operators, there are very few who do not know' at least one cabinet minister personally. Some ministers 
used to come to buy kapenta in bulk at producer price. White fishers use this acquaintance to protect their access 
rights.' Therefore state governance paradigm does not guarantee equitable resource redistribution amongst the 
nationals, especially where there is skewed wealth distribution. State governance can be influenced by lobbying 
and negotiations and it is the wealthier group with economic power that succeeds in maintaining or even 
strengthen its position.
The willing seller, willing buyer principle
With pressure from Indigenous Kapenta Producers Association (IKPA) and a desire to please the electorate in 
preparation for 1990 general elections, the government sought to speed up the redistribution of access rights into 
the fishery. To this end, both the DNPWLM and fishers agreed that the maximum ceiling for permits per entity 
Should be nine and that the minimum should be four. This was designed to benefit both small companies owned 
by blacks and emerging black entrepreneurs. Established companies, in turn, were supposed to dispose their 
license/fishing vessels on a willing seller willing buyer basis, an arrangement designed to simulate pure market 
processes. However the upper and lower limits were flawed. As one operator put it:
9
"It is pointless to have variations in the number of licenses by company because the costs of running a 
company are the same. You need the same costs for a manager, an accountant and a welder irrespective 
of company size".
To avoid the situations were established companies with good credit facilities bought up most of the small 
companies, the DNPWLM was supposed to identify suitable (black) buyers for the companies. The willing seller 
willing buyer principle was expected to apply even after the redistribution period. The price of a kapenta fishing 
vessel, however, was far too high for black entrepreneurs. This has frustrated efforts to see the redistribution 
process through, and the license redistribution programme did not yield the expected results.
The number of white owned companies continued to increase between 1990 to 1995 as shown in Table 2. Fears 
over alienating international donors, investors and powerful private capital, largely in the hands of whites, has 
forced the government to proceed with caution in its efforts to address racial imbalances. Redressing the 
inequitable distribution of access rights to natural resources in Zimbabwe has degenerated into conflict between 
the state and the western super powers. The market solution (guided by the state's administrative machinery) was 
used without adequate credit facilities and sound capacity building initiatives. This has led to the establishment 
of fishing operations operating very few fishing vessels that fail to operate above the break-even point.
The sliding scale
Following the failure of the willing seller to release enough licenses on to market for the willing buyer to 
purchase, the IKPA made representations to government seeking equitable license redistribution. The 
government introduced economic disincentives for established companies to hold many licenses. In May 1995, 
the minister withdrew and terminated all commercial fishing permits pending a decision regarding the conditions 
of reissue (Herald, 13 June 1997). In 1996, the DNPWLM forwarded a second notice to operators informing 
them that as of January 1996 there was to be a reduction in the number of permits held by each operator. The 
notice also advised operators that a sliding scale for license fees was to be introduced. The sliding scale was 
designed to increase production costs for those with more than two fishing licenses/vessels. This development 
was, however, contested in law courts by the Kapenta Producers Association, which represents the interests of 
white operators. In 1997, the sliding scale was ruled invalid (Zimbabwe Independent, 1997). Therefore sliding 
scale approach caught up in all kinds of internal juridical problems and this has not been effective in delivering 
access rights to the previously disadvantaged indigenous people. This has complicated the collaboration between 
the fishers and the state in the management of the fishery. The majority of established fishers live in a state of 
considerable uncertainty concerning their futures.
Indigenisation
In 1998, the government, under pressure from black businesses collapsing on account of globalisation, 
introduced an ‘indigenisation’ policy. The policy seeks to reduce poverty amongst the majority of 
Zimbabweans. Two of the objectives of indigenisation, which have a direct impact on the kapenta fishery are, 
firstly “to democratise the ownership of the economy so as to eliminate racial differences arising from economic 
disparities”, and secondly, to develop entrepreneurship and economic management skills through training (State 
Enterprises and Indigenisation Department, 1998: 12). The policy created favourable conditions for the 
advancement and empowerment of the disadvantaged groups in Zimbabwe in order to bring about equity 
amongst the different groups.
Underjthis policy, the natural resources endowment of a province determined the areas of indigenisation (State 
Enterprises and Indigenisation Department, 1999). In the case of Kariba, resources that form the basis for
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indigenisation are the kapenta fishery and the gill net fishery. There are questions within the kapenta fishing 
industry regarding the definition of the term ‘indigenous’. Although some operators argue that it implies the 
‘black’ race, objections are raised by established operators that the term applied to all those who were bom and 
brought up in Zimbabwe. Indigenisation has not achieved much in terms of black advancement. It may be due to 
the fact that the policy is still at its introductory stage within the kapenta fishing industry.
Conclusion
The kapenta fishery has demonstrated that the institutional set up has very little relevance in guaranteeing-the 
efficient management of a fishery and the equitable distribution of access rights to it. This study has 
demonstrated that as long as there is inequality among the resource users, management regulations that are 
designed to protect the resource against overexploitation and resource degradation may lead to the polarisation 
of the users. The management regulations become a source of conflict between the state and amongst the users.
Restructuring of the kapenta fishing industry is based on affirmative action and the need to reverse 
discriminatory practices and not on technical merit. No considerations were put on the likely disruptive of the 
investment patterns and economies of scale acquired over the years. The restructuring process, within the 
kapenta fishery focused on equitable distribution of access rights. It therefore failed to change inequalities that 
were created within the credit, input and output markets. Information on markets and technological development 
remain skewed in favour of the established companies. As a result, inequalities based on appropriation skills, 
initial endowment, access to credit and markets persisted with the industry.
As has been demonstrated in this study, inequalities distribute incentives in different directions resulting in 
antagonistic relations among resource appropriators and between appropriators and the state. Baland and Plateau 
(1999) argued that in a regulative setting inequalities tend to reduce the acceptability of available regulative 
schemes by the most vulnerable group making collective action in management very difficult. Though this can 
be the case within the kapenta fishery, inequalities have brought together fishers (though on racial grounds) to 
advance their collective best interests.
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